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Casey Kuhlman |
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Here’s to the embarkation on a great journey. Here’s to a massive flop or a spectacular success. Here’s to nothing in between. Here’s to risk. Here’s to reward. Here’s to taking a chance. Here’s to never being satisfied with what is. Here’s to questioning. Here’s to listening. Here’s to excellence. Here’s to professionalism. Here’s to helping everywhere we can in every way we can to everyone we can. Here’s to solving problems. Here’s to trust in unwavering allies. And most of all. Here’s doing our best to impact in those we touch in some small way that truly speaking tomorrow is going to be a better day.
For almost four years now I’ve been a careful observer of Somali politicians. For three of those years I was paid to try to be their lawyer. To provide them expert international legal assistance tied to a deep network full of some of the finest international practitioners and thinkers in the world. But they rarely, if ever, wanted that help. So largely I invented work, I went into meetings and had a product to sell. I can’t buy you new computers, but I how about I help you write that legal framework that Parliament has required you to do?
I’ve spent a lot of time with Somali politicians, and I also spend a lot of time with other people who spend a lot of their time with Somali politicians. This is an expat’s life when you live in a pretty small town. I reference Hargeisa, a town of, oh, 500,00 to 1M people depending on who’s estimating as a small town.
And that it truly is. This is one of the most amazing things when you really get to know an African town. To learn how inter-connected things are is fascinating. This is what makes me do something foolish like invest everything I have into starting a law firm in a country which has very little (if any) law. Judges routinely dismiss cases with little to no justification. Parliamentarians make no estimates, and rarely even discuss, what the effects of this law will be in the next month, much less the next year – so legislation (a lot of it quite decent) is routinely ignored.
And yet things work. I don’t believe in libertarianism – much to my father’s chagrin – it is incredibly unjust and inefficient. But I can say the Somalis are teaching me how to respect it, and how to work within its boundaries. I know a little but more importantly I truly care deeply about this place. I have spent more time in this place than I had in any one place since I was in college. I have joined, in many ways, the ranks of the diaspora (only the opposite way that that term is used).
For a long time, when I first arrived, it seemed like no one really got what the hell was happening down here. See Nairobi is a long way away. And after the 2008 Hargeisa bombings, when pretty much all of the expats left the connections between Hargeisa and Nairobi were even more tenuous. So a disconnect really felt like it developed. Luckily, over the course of the previous year it has felt like “Nairobi” is starting to get it. I don’t agree with everything I’m hearing coming out of the high level cluster meetings and typical other rumor mill stuff, but I must say that I agree with a lot of it (see, e.g., this initiative by the UK’s government).
I did not think that a harder military strategy off the coast would reduce piracy. I really felt that a tribunal in Somaliland along with a huge police building effort in Puntland was the best possible shot at fixing things (basically pirate DDR is what needs to happen); I still feel this needs to happen, but the military situation seems to be putting a recent damper on the number of attacks. So they may be right, they may be wrong, but at least they aren’t dead wrong. Not the way they were dead wrong in the early nighties when everyone that knew anything about Somalia would tell you how clearly wrong some of the actions were.
Nairobi (by which I mean the big money and big – even if distant – powers), seems to be starting to understand two things: there has to be some element of external assistance to stabilize the situation, BUT the Somalis want to have assurances that this isn’t an invasion or their territorial fires start overheating. To do that largely means staying the hell out of the politics BUT also helping to create the conditions of stability long enough for the Somalis to figure out how they will be represented and what the terms are – which can often take months or years – even where you have a majority clan conferences these things take lots of time.
Most Somali analysts are quick to point out that the reason the South cannot seem to fix itself is that the Italians castrated the clan leader system. The problem has been for a long time that no one had the moral authority – among the Southern clans – to stand up to the gangsters that kept hijacking clan resources, state resources, international resources. They just continued to gobble them up like locusts and when they reached an end to their resources they just started gobbling each other. From the early warlord phase into the ICU takeover this is what continued happening.
But a couple of other things were happening also beneath the surface of that. For twenty years there seems to have been an identity crisis within much of the Somali community. This identity, just like lots of things in our lives, runs to the safest place it can find when it is threatened. For most Somalis that is somewhere around one or two or three or four or five clans below the major clan level. It varies by the individual and their experience where this safe place is. One thing I can say for sure, that for most people I’ve met in four years Northerners, Southerners, Easterners and Westerners, for the vast vast percentage of these people that place is no where even close to the pan-Somali level. This is and will for a long time remain the invalidity in the argument that the pan-Somali movement was a viable option without a dictator.
Even after twenty years Somaliland politicians bicker nearly continuously; lack of trust within Somaliland is rife. The same can be said, only the distrust rises as you go clockwise around the circle.This deep distrust is deep seated in Somali lore going back to way before the mad mullah. By the time you get to Isaaq’s grandsons, they were already fighting with each other. I don’t like all my cousins, but I certainly know I’m not ready to fight with them.
Luckily the Somalilanders – at the end and often despite this distrust – they make it work. Things haven’t fallen apart here and actually are going pretty well. It has taken a long time to solidify the post-conflict gains and to begin the development phase of their state building, but it is going. And, perhaps more importantly, it is going at a Somali pace. Somaliland really did have to retract after it separated from the South into basically a federated microstate solution. Sure there was a central government created at the Burco conference. But the amount of power and influence of that government was marginal. One cannot compare the power that Silanyo has with the power that Tuur had. The central government was present, but it has taken almost two decades of steady work before anyone gives it any mind about being anything other than a minor inconvenience.
This is another incredibly fascinating thing about being here now, this is the point where the Somaliland Government is really figuring itself and really trying to exert some will.
This gets us to the microstate solution. In my view, it should be endorsed as it is probably the best viable option currently. Some of the donors seem to be realizing that – as reflected in much of the language coming from the UK as well as the US’s two-track policy shift. In my opinion, the donors need to throttle back the incentives for state capture. When the mandate for the TFG ends UNDP needs to have the political courage to stop paying Parliamentarian salaries, and other than emergency aid the rest of the money flowing into the South needs to end. Then the donors need to let the Somalis work from their grassroots (microstate) levels up.
Equal with this the Somalis have to take ownership. They really have to stop blaming all of their problems on the international community and take ownership for their own mistakes. I can fully accept many Somalis gripes about the prior actions of external actors. And I fully understand their paranoia about external interventions in their problems. But equally they have to trust a bit more. And they have to take a lot more ownership. This is, at its most elemental, a Somali problem, and they have to be the ones to figure the solutions out.
I am cautiously optimistic about London Conference. A lot of the right things appear to being said. We will see what will happen but if the donors really wanted to get to the roots of the problems, they need to just shut up and they need to hold their next conference in a place which is neutral enough to get all of the important-to-Somalis people under a great big, giant ass tree and then they need to not show up and to not pay. And then let them stay there until they figure it out. It will take a hell of a long time, but it will get done.
It has taken the fine work of a lot of Somalis and Westerners for the awareness to be sufficiently raised as to why we’re here and what the hell can we do about it. I must say for the first time in a while I’m cautiously optimistic about all of the Somali region.
For more perspective on the London Conference here are a few articles I thought highly incisive, particularly from the Somaliland view point: Article 1, Article 2.
The other day, my dad asked me to write a short piece about what my daily life is like in Somaliland. I usually refrain from such things, but I think it is a good opportunity to show how normal everything is here. With a few caveats.
I generally awake between 9 and 10. Although this is late for a work day, if you read to the end you’ll see why. Mostly everyone else is out of the office in the morning either in court or meetings or taking care of personal errands. This is great for me, since I’m a slow waker so I like the peacefulness in the mornings as it lets me wake at a reasonable pace. In many ways the afternoons and mornings are sort of flipped around from life in the US. Things start slowly here for almost everyone. Although I used to have my own house that I rented, these days I’m spending less long stretches in Hargeisa and so we have built a sleeping room here at the office for me to use when I’m here and for the team to use after a late night working when I’m not.
After a freezing cold shower that although painful is effective at getting your juices flowing, I head into our office. I share and office with Hassan, my Vice President, but he is rarely there in the mornings. I like to begin my day with a cup of coffee and some news, as many others do. Here that comes in a flask of Ethiopian coffee my watchman brings from our close Ethiopian tin shack shop and accompanied by my scans of my Google Reader (using Feedly’s skin), Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr feeds. I generally do a more or less quick scan in the mornings. I read a few smaller articles from my feeds, but I just generally skim the headlines and then mark the longer articles that seem interesting for my Readability queue.
After I’m finished with the news, I then usually begin working on whatever lies in front of me. I usually try to start the working day with the mundane admin tasks that don’t require as much thought as my client work. About 12:30 or 1:00 I’ll realize that I’m hungry and ask my watchman to go bring my lunch. We have a hotel about two blocks away that serves a decently nice chicken sandwich and edible fries (which is my typical lunch order). When I reach a stopping point in my work then I take a small break and migrate into our chewing room. This usually involves several trips to get all of the waste baskets in the office, rearrange the cushions in the room, make sure the tea cups and ashtrays are brought in, and also that all my accoutrement is ready.
I like to eat in the relaxation of the sitting room while listening to either some music or a podcast. The rest of the gang usually arrives somewhere between 2 and 3. Our majlis is almost always open to people if they are interested in coming to chat with us. The only times we ask people not to come are when we have a meeting planned. On a typical afternoon, we’ll have 7 to 10 people with us for varying lengths of time.
Chewing sessions are interesting. You make an effort to prepare your spot so everything you’ll need for the next 6 to 12 hours is within your reach. You make sure that your water, your tea, your soft drinks, your fake beer, your chat, your phone, your computer (and cord), your wallet, keys, everything is just around you. At our office, we developed a habit of using our wastebaskets as small tables for our laptops. It works fantastically as the laptop doesn’t overhead and when you’re sitting on the floor it is at a really good height so your back does not get jarred. Also it is quite easy to move when you are changing the way that you sit.
Chewing sessions generally start quite festive and then steadily deteriorate into quietness. Everyone usually is chatting at the beginning, or reading some news, or checking their facebook. Then after everyone is more or less settled in they begin work. In many offices, not only ours, the real work takes place at chewing sessions. Although many expats in Hargeisa are very much against qat (for admittedly valid reasons) the argument that it makes people lazy I simply don’t buy. For me, it focuses me and I actually work quite well when I’ve had a normal dosage of qat. The high you get from qat, if one can even call it a high, is very subtle and take a long time to settle in.
Some people join us but do not have work that day so they will chat or listen to Somali songs or watch TV depending on their moods. The rest of us either put on headphones or we just listen as we are working. It is not unlike a co-working space.
The great thing about a chewing session is that when you need a break or if you have a question you just ask or you just visit with people. If something comes on the news people will generally discuss. If there had been a big political incident earlier that day it will get analyzed in detail. And sometimes people will just work or chat on facebook. It is a very relaxed environment.
Usually people leave between 9 and 10. At this point in the night, I’m usually getting my best work done and so I will often stay going until about 2 or 3 when I snoozily saunter to the sleeping room. Then the cycle starts all over again. So that’s a typical Somaliland day. With a few pictures.
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When I was in college my friend Dave and I would often fall asleep at some point during our millionth screening of Braveheart. We would often put the film on after the bars had closed and we had grabbed our drunken treat of the night and were not yet ready for bed. At the time we were training to be Marine officers and very interested in learning what it took to be a good leader. Near the beginning of the film there was a quote which I often thought about (at still think about):
You admire this man, this William Wallace. Uncompromising men are easy to admire. He has courage; so does a dog. But it is exactly the ability to compromise that makes a man noble. And understand this: Edward Longshanks is the most ruthless king ever to sit on the throne of England. And none of us, and nothing of Scotland will remain, unless we are as ruthless. Give ear to our nobles. Knowing their minds is the key to the throne.
We would scoff at this quote. In our youth and lack of exposure to the world we felt that uncompromising was the way of the greatest leaders. That may still be true, but I have learned that it definitely is not true of the greatest rulers. Indeed, the greatest rulers are often those that are the greatest to compromise. Human nature being what it is, you will very rarely have complete agreement with a course of action. Multiply the amount of people a decision will affect and you necessarily multiply the different opinions (both rational and irrational) which will impact your decision before it is taken and laud or critique it after it is taken. This is a fundamental “problem” with ruling in a democracy.
Ryan Lizza has written a fantastically interesting piece for The New Yorker. He dives deeply into a trove of memos which circulated the Obama White House during the first term of that administration. He assembles a very interesting piece which does a great job of detailing the tensions that any President may face. I encourage everyone to read it, here.
It is interesting for me, given my current diaspora state (relatively torn between Europe, America, and Africa), to compare the political processes which take place in a very new, somewhat inchoate democracy – Somaliland – to a very old, overly complex democracy – the US – while comparing both, which I view as an insider, to the relatively “clean” democratic processes that the Europeans embody. One of the difficult things in an independent executive system, where the governing functions of creating laws and putting those laws into action are separated between two branches of government, is that we tend to blame the “big man” for all of the problems. This happens in Somaliland just as often as it happens in the US. The realities of Presidential campaigns often do a disservice by blurring the lines. Much of the debate during a Presidential campaign revolves around big or small policy ideas that the President will have very little to no control over. As I was telling someone the other day, a President has an ability to stop a legislative action it doesn’t want to allow but it has little ability to make a legislative body do something that that body does not want to do. Yet these big policy ideas are a function of modern politics. Firstly they are easier to discuss than the minutae of what a President really does. Secondly, it is a method of acting somewhat uniformly in our very much decentralized system.
Personally, reading the piece shows me what I was hoping to see. A President who has learned how to do what is possibly the most difficult and complex job on the planet. A President who remains willing to make compromises, but also has learned how to work the system. A President who still has standards and struggles to balance a bowing to the political winds with a deep devotion to his ideals.
While Obama cannot get a large piece of greenhouse gas passed through (right now) domestically, he has floated a ton of money for research, innovation, and implementation of greenhouse reduction initiatives in other countries. While Obama faces complete stonewalling from his own legislators on jobs (right now), he has figured out how to incentivize job growth and business creation in other countries with entrepreneurial grants and collaborative agreements dominating much of the AID/DOS grants I’ve seen lately. While Obama cannot push forward comprehensive immigration reform (right now), he has put in place policies which make it much easier to get US visas (while remaining within the legislative caps mandated by various amendments to the Immigration and Nationalization Act) and illegal immigration flows are down – particularly from Mexico. These are largely international examples for a couple of reasons. First it is my area of interest so I follow it closer. Second the President has fundamentally more power over foreign policy than domestic policy. Third, Hillary – despite how divisive she may or may not be – is a brilliant bureaucrat and many of these initiatives are coming from her shop.
No government is perfect, but where the President and his team have a reasonable amount of power I am genuinely pleased with what I see. There’s much to disagree with, but there is much more that I agree with. As we turn towards a full scale assault on us all with respect to choosing our next President one thing I would encourage everyone to do is to not get tricked by the red herrings of advertisements and debates and to focus on what the President can and does actually do on a daily / weekly / monthly / yearly basis. Choose wisely.
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We are smack in the middle of a heck of a travelling ten days. Left Chattanooga where we had Christmas for Glasgow where we had New Years via Atlanta (shuttle), London (plane), and Edinburgh (rental car). Then down to L’s farm in Southwest corner of Scotland. Then up to Edinburgh for a nap then to Den Haag via Amsterdam (plane and train). Thursday I trek down to Hargeisa via Zurich, Dubai, and Berbera.
Since I only have a very limited time here in the Hague before I return to Hargeisa, today I had to go get my haircut. I had been in the states for a few months and L wasn’t sure about the state of my hair upon arriving for the Christmas celebrations. The current outlook was grim at any rate. I had purposely delayed getting it cut (and my beard closely trimmed) because I am sometimes incredibly neglgent at life but also because I quite like my Turkish barber here in the Hague.
One thing I am learning about myself is how important patronage is. When I view it through the lens of community formation, patronage becomes exceedingly important to me. The word patron is a funny word. Reconciling medieval notions of artists who had patrons with more modern exclamatories of “don’t patronize me” leaves quite an imterpretive swath. Yet, the patronage I mean I to give someone your business more or less on a regular basis. Sometimes it is an exclusive arrangement; sometimes not. In others words I mean it in the same sense as to become a regular.
Some of the difficulties of living a nomad’s life are eased by assembling small pockets of communities where you are known. But communities, are living things and thereby require engagement in order to survive and to thrive. If you don’t participate in and engage with your communities the linkages between you and them whither. Sometimes it takes an extraordinarily long time for the connections to whither – as I found upon a trip to visit old, grand friends in September after too long apart. Sometimes it doesn’t take long at all for connections to whither – as I found out upon numerous trips to the same Panera where they never once gave me a singular look of recognition.
When the barber was almost ready for me, one of his partners walked in and asked me into his chair. I politely refused the earliest available barber for my guy. My guy speals not a lick of English and I not a lick of Dutch. So we have said very little to one another besides yes / no and some serious sign language. And yet, I feel (perhaps it is one sided) that we have a connection. When I saw me walk in there was a look of recognition on his face. Perhaps he’s just a good actor, but either way it made me feel quite happy to be a known commodity instead of an unknown commodity briefly flitting into and out of existence.
When I first sat in his chair on our first meeting, he looked at my hair for a second, realized I didn’t speak Dutch and then just grabbed some of my hair indicated a length, I said no, he went shorter, I said yes. That was it until the end when I smiled and rubbed my chin. He used his finger and thumb to indicate short, medium, or long. I said medium with my fingers. Then I gave him the money and went on my way happier for the nice relax and small nap I had gotten while at the barber. Many like to go to their barbers for the news and gossip. I like to go to close my eyes and have a bit of relax. To turn my brain off for a split second. After that first cut, when L saw it, she said it was the best cut I had received in ages. This sealed the deal. So now I am his customer.
I have been a few times since that first time and every time I enjoy the ridiculous Turkish sappy pop songs and the fifties traditional decorating scheme with its marble and glass shelves and perfume bottles and potted plants and overall uptown Manhattan feel circa 1950. But also I get a really great haircut. So now I am willing to get a bit feral in order to wait till I can get back to the Hague to see my barber.
This is a pretty normal way of living ones life it seems to me. Most people I know have a favorite haircutter. It is a funny profession in that way. So universal. It should be known as the fourth or fifth oldest profession. Every community on earth has a barber shop and for a vast majority of the communities the barber shop is a hub of the community. A gathering point for gossip and discussion. A place which did not require the time or effort that a pub required. A place which you never know who you would run into. I like that even if I cannot gossip about who recently married whom at my barber shop, that I can at least walk in and he knows what to do.
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Sitting in a concrete cube, impersonal and loud with tiled floor and cinder walls that echo his fears, frustrations, and rage my friend is pacing in a provincial town in Somalia. He waits for a call that he hopes will end the worst purgatory he has ever felt. He waits for a call that will shatter his world. Will it be ne or the other, or the continuation of time stiff arming his attempts to do….something. Anything. For fuck’s sake this happens to other people, not to my people. I know these things because I know my friend. I know he will not sleep tonight, even though I told him to. I know this because I can see the green dot of presence when I incessant check facebook, just as impotently emasculated as he. For news. Of something.
No one doubts that aid work is hard. We bitch and moan about lack of food, shitty water, lack of fast internet and all the rest of it. But it is the times like this when the real shit happens. These are the times when it is truly hard. when doing your job puts your family and closest of friends at risk. Why the fuck do we do what we do? For them? For us? For a job?
I want with 95% of my soul to jump on a plane. But what on earth will that accomplish? Nothing. So instead of channeling my own rage for the angst and suffering of my friends I am left to watch the list of ‘Praying for you”s grow on a facebook wall. There is no way to reason through it. There is nothing to do. I can put my head in my hands. I can support. And that’s it.
So instead, I write this. I write about friendship. Because in aid, unlike in any other industry I know of, you forge friendships which are simply impossible in other worlds. After spending a week with someone laughing at your inability to leave the compound because the threat of terrorists attacks is too high (even for risk takers from small NGOs). After drinking yourself stupid after the most vicious of weeks imaginable. After chuckling at the little absurdities and cultural incongruities. After talking politics of a country not your own. After vacationing to the most beautiful little tucked away shitholes in the world. After wine at sunset. And dogs at dusk. After making bread, and canning peppers, and christmas dinner for all you know together. After these and a million other memories which you cherish for the rest of your life. You come to know people.
I have no thoughts which are greater than this. I have been unable to think today. My thoughts are in a place far from here. My brain is non-existent. And I wait. And I hope. And maybe, just maybe, for the first time in a long time. I pray.
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I just finished watching the jobs speech and my first thought was “were have you been”? The historian-poet-preacher in him which I fell in love with in the Yes We Can and Race speeches (collectively rather than individually) had found his groove tonight.
Every artist struggles with finding their artistic voice, but for me, at this moment, this was balm to my soul. Someone, somewhere, does actually get it. But before I get to what I liked about the speech let me take a small detour and talk about how I think about my relationship between me and my government.
I’m currently staying at my brother’s, @kuhlman, house and he has a great dane. Due to our pomo lives we missed each other. He is off on a construction job overnight and I just returned from an overnight job myself. We missed each other and were not able to pass a key back and forth. When we were texting each other as to our current statuses and how we could coordinate this changeover, I asked him whether the house was locked. He responded, “Maggie’s the lock.”
Now Maggie is a wonderful bitch (which I mean literally). This bitch has a bark that will tear your hair off when she gets scared. I have no idea whether she has the bite to match it, and I like that I don’t know that, because her bark is scary enough. She is the perfect lock. See locks are on-off switches. But living, breathing beings are able to differentiate between when on is OK and off is OK. Sometimes the best lock is the one that can differentiate between when to bark and when to be happy because your friend is here to let you out to go take a piss.
And this is how I want my government to be. I don’t want to rely on my government unnecessarily. I understand that my successes and my failures are my own. But sometimes you want to know that if you are forced, due to the situations of living your life, to deviate from your normal patterns, that there will be a being there to have your back. You don’t want something that is impersonal and cannot differentiate between friend and foe. You want a bitch there that is both happy to see you and happy to go have a poo in the yard.
That story said, there were many things that I loved about the Obama speech.
First, he chastised both sides. He told some hard truths. These words were his preacher robes which I have not seen him don for a long, long time. Too long. And it was needed. Both sides of the political aisle have been being babies for a while now and the only people suffering are the middle class of America. This must change. The only way to get shit done is to sometimes put aside the differences and realize that the betterment of the country is at stake. Since I’ve spent so much time in African countries where politics is so personality based I am especially receptive to the in-out-group mechanisms which operate in such an environment. And if you want to actually help, if you want to get something done in this world you’re going to have to figure out a compromise. Because, as the President of the United States, said “No single individual built America on their own. We built it together. .” What a great line. Sometimes we have to act as a community. Individualism is great, but no one at no time has EVER acted completely in isolation as an individual. We call those beings the last creature of their species. What is required, from time to time, is looking out for those that may not be as smart, or have the opportunities, or whatever as we fancy of ourselves. And in that vein, next week I hope to go pound some nails to help members of my family’s community who were affected by the tornadoes earlier this year.
Second, it was perhaps the most patriotic speech which has been given during my lifetime. It was a call to action. It was competitive (which we Americans love). It told us that there was going to be some hard days ahead. This was the poet that I’ve been longing for. This was the inspiration that I’ve been hoping for. This was the America that I have studied and that I love. Just turn off your brain (I’ll get to the wonky stuff in a moment) and listen to the words of his speech and tell me that you are not inspired by something, or even anything in this speech. No matter your political affiliation this man gets that he was “hired” to execute the laws in the best interest of us all.
Third, it cut through all the bullshit, stupid rhetoric which neither matters nor helps. He has learned from his own failures to properly leverage both the power of his position and the wave of people power which put him in that chair. This was a pragmatic speech to its core. What he said is exactly, exactly, what economists have proven matter for the economic development of your country. There are many opinions as to the best, but almost every economist will agree that what is necessary for economic development (this comes from my international development perspective) is: infrastructure, education, jobs for low-skilled individuals, and healthcare. We’ll leave aside for now the reasons why each of these exist. Similarly I’m going to take a mulligan on healthcare because I don’t have the energy to enter that debate as to why people that don’t have millions in the bank don’t deserve to not feel awful all the time, but if you care about that watch Sicko and shutup. But see here’s the thing. Our schools are falling apart. While we prosecute irrational wars overseas (which I’ve participated in and have some modicum of epistemic authority here), we’re not able to give the support that our teachers require to educate our children. Our infrastructure is subpar. Visit Europe and try to convince me that we are still number one. Drill, Baby, Drill.
So this is a short review, but my early take (before reading any punditry) is that it was brilliant and one of Obama’s best performances. On a personal level I’m happy for three reasons: (1) the poet I wanted is finding his voice, (2) the pragmatist we all need is finally leveraging his platform, and (3) the wonk in me is reassured that someone up there will bark when necessary and greet when necessary.
There were many great moments of this speech for me. But the one that stands out. The one that I will think of tomorrow. Is this.
No single individual built America on their own. We built it together. We have been, and always will be, one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all; a nation with responsibilities to ourselves and with responsibilities to one another. Members of Congress, it is time for us to meet our responsibilities.
What did you think of the speech?
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I walked to work this morning. While I was getting ready for work my phone was streaming an album which I found last night to be ultra-enjoyable. My headphones were with me; so, I plugged them into the phone and started walking. Got to work; sat down at my desk computer to type this; the album is still playing. Seamlessly it has flown to my ears via 4G wireless and .11n wireless. I have not purchased this album, but I’m going to see the band in about 10 days if I’m able.
This is our wonderful, vibrant, modern world. Where pop music is crowd-sourced and GOOD. No more do we need to rely on corporate people with obvious biases and conflicting inclinations, torn between their artistic roots and boardroom future, who push out to the masses bubblegum crap. These days bubblegum crap still does OK, but nothing like it did in the 90′s. These days, if you don’t have a real soul, if you lack authenticity, you are less likely to “make” it than in the past. I listened to a Moth podcast by one of the Milli Vanilli guys earlier this week who was talking about how things went down for them. I cannot even imagine that happening. Even the corporate music world (I think) understands that it takes more than a pretty face, great hair, and an ability to dance to make it. Unless you want to be a dancer – which you can. I love it.
When you wanted to impress a girl you brought her over, and if she was artsy you figured out a way to let her see your music collection. CDs organized on metal or wooden racks prominently displayed in your room. This is how it was done for decades. Because as was said in High Fidelity, “music, art, television, these things matter, they connect us.” It was a shorthand way to tell her your story in a really interesting way. The tingles of “ohhhhhh, I looooooove this album” and you knew that you had made a connection. Those things were real. Although we are losing the physical objects, it seems to me that the social interaction portion is still very much alive and well.
Now we get to spotify. My friend Frank sent me an invite a couple of weeks ago, and I must say it is only alright if you don’t pay. But then I said let me try their pay service. And a whole new world opened up. It is unbelievable. They have figured out the perfect marriage of a huge library, vibrant community of humans I actually know, along with all my music. What I love about it, is that to be cool on spotify doesn’t matter how big your record collection is, because everyone is operating on the same exact set of tunes. It doesn’t matter if you are a rich person who can afford to spend hundreds on tons of new CD’s or if you are dirt poor and just want to listen to great stuff. You both are operating on the same pay model and have access to the same stuff. We Americans love our individuality and there is something to be said for that, but the Europeans have gone much further than we have in figuring out how to manage communities by sharing. So what does matter on Spotify. I’m not sure as I’m really new to the community, but I suspect what really matters is not the size or breadth of the money that you have spent on albums but on what you have put together, what you have created, mashed up, and collated. It is is your playlists idiot.
That’s how I’m going to judge you in our amazing, cloudy, pomo world. Have a great day everyone, find some good art, enjoy the hell out of it, smile at your neighbors and dance for no reason.
And if you want to know what album I was loving, check out this band.
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The original photo is here, my alteration is here. If I had to title the alteration, I would call it An Homage to Motherhood.
This post is a bit random in nature, but it is a compilation of some sources and commentary and thought. So think of it as more of a collage than a strict narrative. Much of this was originally posted on Google+.
We’ve known this was coming for well over six months. According to here, it has been well known since November 2010 which seems about right to me. Those that are paid to do handle these things were trying their best (more on that in a minute) to address the situation but were unable to deliver the food aid at that time. There’s little to suggest that anything has changed in the interim and delivery of the aid will somehow be magically easier.
Up here in Somaliland we were taking bucket showers as early as March of this year. Although it does take a while to get to the point where there is a certified famine (due to a strict criteria to certify a disaster/drought as a famine), all of the early warning systems worked. The rains ended up coming for Somaliland, but they did not come (until a couple of weeks ago, and way too late for the livestock and vegetables) for the South. Yet in Somaliland the Government took a lot of steps to ease the suffering of the pastoralists and farmers in their territory.
Amaryta Sen is famous for saying that all famines are avoidable failures of governments. Somaliland’s government passed that test. Ministers were out escorting water tankers into the country-side, TV shows on water conservation were aired on national television (not that Somalis need these lessons, but anyway), and mostly it was a local re-distribution effort rather than an international aid effort.
It is an impossible hypothetical what would have happened if the rains had not come to Somaliland. Yet, I suspect that the efforts would have been decently well-thought out and executed as a community. All of it would have been led by Somalis with the international community playing a supporting role, as it should be.
The famine is confined to two regions of very Southern Somalia which are sparsely populated to begin with. Although millions are at risk, it isn’t millions that are actually suffering. This isn’t meant to minimize the suffering of those that are suffering, it is simply to bring some perspective. I’m not cynical, how can you be when you look at pictures like this.
Coincidentally, these are the same areas where al-Shabaab has a very strong control over the population. One picture that has certainly caught my eye is of a Shabaab soldier with rows and rows of squatting women behind him looking distraught. The photographer obviously focused on the warrior, but the women in the background are the stars of the shot for me. It is a soberingly iconic reminder of what is really going on. See the picture here, and look close.
Shabaab has been playing both sides of this issue. First they banned nearly every aid agency from working in their zones. This was a long time ago, and ironically enough when I’ve been in Nairobi talking to people who work in the South they were telling me that the (non-Somali) agencies which were allowed to continue working were faith-based organizations like World Vision and ADRA. Mostly these organizations were headed by one or at most two Kenyans and largely they were left alone to do their work, except for one young aid worker I heard about who was killed by Shabaab for proselytizing. We may feel bad for the man’s family, but it was a bit of Darwinism at work if you ask me.
WFP-Somalia is, for those of us that have been in/worked on Somalia for more than 30 seconds, about the most dysfunctional organization. I have serious doubts that the increases in aid will end up as food in bellies – except for (maybe) those that are working in Daadab where it is a bit more straight-forward to deliver and where there is some semblance of oversight. Also there are fundamental structural problems with the way aid agencies (including NGOs and UN organs) are built and work. See here for a great discussion of this (but rather technical if you’re not into the biz of aid/development). The summary:
In summary, a major reason why aid agency presence has not translated into reduced vulnerability to, for example, famine, is due to aid agencies not being geared to do just that:
- Aid agencies do not build their programs around context, but are influenced by donor interest, assumptions, internal capacity and their own models of approach.
- Aid agencies don’t have resources that can be quickly tasked from one mode of operation (development) to another (emergency response).
- Aid agencies’ internal measuring systems do not hold them accountable to how well they reduce the risk of a disaster happening, only on how well they acheive project deliverables.
- And aid agencies own internal systems and staffing do not allow a seamless transition from a long-term development presence to an emergency response.
Yes, the international community has made many mistakes. But I do not believe that it is the role of the international community to lead at times like this. I strongly believe that the role of the international community is to support local efforts with materiale, technical assistance, logistics expertise, and funding. I am disheartened by the increasing frequency of calls for an intervention on the level of the 92/93 intervention which burst the New World Order bubble and ushered in a decade of UN futility as the world’s largest NGO + body of political discourse.
Even though it is true that the international community, US, UK, Italy, etc. are definitely not without fault, I’m terribly tired of the narrative which places the entirety of the blame on these external parties. An example is here, where there is an entire, well written post by an educated Somali without the smallest hint of acceptance for any responsibility by the Somali community for what is happening (other than a few “criminals”). Here’s the crux of his argument.
If we had had foresight and acted upon it; if the Marines had disarmed the warlords; if the U.N. Security Council had issued arrest warrants for the warlords early on, stopping them from prolonging the failure of the state; if the Security Council had dealt with the warlords — who had denied starving millions access to food — speedily and decisively, in the same way it dealt with the genocidal regimes in Serbia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan, then al-Qaeda would not have established a secure base from which to plan terrorist attacks. Our country would not have been hamstrung by the enormity of our problem, nor would it have become the world’s worst humanitarian disaster.
A friend on G+ asked me a good question:
I would be interested if anybody knows some more details on the reason Al-Shabab has refused to let the aid organisations in. I mean, no matter what they publicly say, I am sure they feel the pressure of famine too. So why is it not possible to find some kind of middle ground? Are the NGOs reluctant to give up control over food deliveries? If yes, is that justified? ~Peter Dorrie
My answer was that that’s part of it. Another big part of it is donor restrictions on supporting terrorist organizations. It is difficult to say with any certainty what Shabaab’s position is as they are terribly decentralized and non-uniform. Their position isn’t terribly rational but it is basically isolationist (like N.Korea, Taliban, Myanmar, etc.). They came to power on an anti-invaders platform and largely have kept to that meme throughout. On top of their irrationalities on banning bras, samosas, music, and anything that is fun, the group is funadamentally more nationalistic than it is Islamist (which is why I have always questioned the depth of their linkages with an Arab-led organization like Al-Qaeda).
There are other things in play. According to this article which examines this in a bit more detail.
The first point I would make is that al Shabab is minimizing the crisis because, as many observers and experts are saying, the movement itself likely made the famine worse. Famines often (always?) result not only from failed rains or population growth, but also government policies, especially denial and inaction. . . . Every indication points to the conclusion that al Shabab not only fit into this regional trend [of refusing to recognize or limiting acknowledgement of the extent of a drought/famine because it highlights the ruling organization's shortcomings or racism], but was – because of its limited resources, its preoccupation with the civil war, and its ideology – a particularly bad offender.
My second thought is that when looking at al Shabab’s hostility to outsiders, it is worthwhile to try to understand the movement’s thinking from the inside. . . . The movement is made up mostly of young men (its name, after all, is Arabic for “the youth”), many of whom were children, or were not even born yet, when the Somali state collapsed in 1991. They have only known war and instability. They have seen weak would-be central governments come and go, they have seen clan rivalry tear at the social and political fabric of the country, and they have seen a parade of external actors, some of whom, like Ethiopia when it occupied Somalia from late 2006 to early 2009, carried out massive violence. Growing up in that environment would brutalize many people and make them deeply suspicious of outsiders.
But the famine strikes directly at the relationship between al Shabab and its constituents. The movement is taking a huge risk if it tries to solve this problem through violence and denial. Al Shabab controls territory, and so it must have some local support – support that is likely based in large part on al Shabab’s ability to offer some security and stability after years of fighting. Allowing the famine to go unchecked could destroy whatever local legitimacy al Shabab possesses, potentially resulting in infighting, fragmentation, rebellions, or desertions. From this perspective, it is not difficult to see why al Shabab originally decided to re-admit external aid agencies. And yet it now seems that paranoia and suspicion of outsiders are winning out in the leadership’s thinking.
For an aid worker’s perception of this see this great article by @morealtitude.
An invitation from al Shabbab central command may sound like a good enough reason to think aid workers would be safe re-entering south-central, but in fact it isn’t. Like many insurgency groups, al Shabbab is as much a network of affiliated warlords as it is a hierarchical paramilitary organization. Fighters on the ground- the ones with guns, grenades and IEDs- will align themselves first with their local commander, and only after that with al Shabbab central. Then there’s the assumption that the message is even getting down to those field grunts and their captains. Or the notion that some 16-year-old with an AKM, who’s never been to school but has spent the last ten years being told that westerners are pillaging his country and deserve to die, will pay any attention to some recent order from someone he’s never heard, when he sees an NGO Land Cruiser drive past.
Through all that I’ve read, I am most heartened by the diaspora involvement. Pull up #feedsomalia and you’ll see lots of activity. New, caring diaspora members are increasing their networks and ability to influence. This is a long-term positive.
While the immediate causes of the crisis have been the drought and insecurity in the south, there is something more fundamental at play here. This article digs a bit beyond the boilerplate rhetoric.
Drought is not a new environmental condition for much of Africa but a recurring one. The semi-arid Horn of Africa and the entire Sahelian region — running just south of the Sahara Desert across the continent — have long experienced erratic rainfall. While climate change may be exacerbating rainfall variability, traditional livelihoods in the region are adaptable to deal with situations when rainfall is not dependable. . . .
Traditionally, herders ranged widely across the landscape in search of better pasture, focusing on areas as meteorological conditions dictated. The approach worked because, unlike fenced-in pastures in North America, it was incredibly flexible and adapted to variable rainfall. As farming has expanded, including in some instances to large-scale commercial farms, the routes of herders have become more concentrated and more vulnerable to drought. [Note, the conflict between the pastoralists and agriculturalists is one of the many, many causes of insecurity in the south.] . . .
Just as death from exposure is not an inherent result of a cold winter, famine is not a natural consequence of drought. Simply put, the structure of human society often determines who is affected and to what degree.
Fundamentally, the core of the problem is a breakdown of the social redistribution networks which are a basis of Somali culture (see Somaliland’s reaction described above). The diaspora should be taking the lead, as they are much closer to the realities of the situation than the US Representative for Somalia (we don’t have an ambassador any longer) is to the situation. The more Somali community leaders take charge, accept the situation, and work towards a solution – the faster the entire situation (meaning more than the famine which is temporary) will stabilize and improve.
For more on the diaspora’s efforts, see here (among other places).
Poverty/Starvation Porn is very real and am happy that it is being talked about outside of the echo chamber of the “aid bloggers/tweeters” (for lack of a better label). There have been some great articles which have challenged the ethics of this type of coverage, which have come out of the situation. Here’s his punch-line:
Because it’s a cycle. African governments know that drought is coming and they don’t prepare. Foreign charities working there talk about long-term plans to help people become self-sufficient but they’ve been failing to achieve them for 20 years. It’s as much about politics and war and poor economic policies as it is about no rain.
I’m no expert but I know that much. I also know it’s wrong that every few years we’re faced with an “emergency” that could have been prevented, that aid groups must frantically try to raise money to respond to, that journalists need to find emaciated babies at death’s door and film and photograph and write about them before the world gives a damn.
While there is some value in showing the extent of suffering, it definitely skews the situation. While that is great marketing for aid organizations, as most of us who have worked in the developing world intuitively understand increases in aid flows do not necessarily end up as food in bellies or kids’ butts on school benches. As Haiti and Japan have shown there is an absorptive capacity formula to disaster relief whereby increases in aid can end up resulting in more rotten food or spoiled medicines rather than where it was intended. As this post from a former World Vision worker puts it, “Poverty is not an image, or a statistic; poverty has a face, a name and a story.”
Yes, most aid workers are quick to admit that there is a dualism to poverty porn as am sure they are quite happy with what they get in their bank account at the end of the month (and largely it is money that is well deserved as this is very hard work). But it is not easy to see what you’re working on cheapened by skewed coverage. Some of the ads for help, in particular the one on the Tumblr dashboard (can’t upload screenshot for some reason but at least the kids in the photo are smiling).
An aid worker / blogger who I have lots of respect for has put it this way in this article.
Articles are starting to look like a fill-the-blanks template that the reporters are all sharing around: Quote some stats about the famine; talk about the complicating factor of al Shabbab making life difficult in Somalia; drop in some pithy quotes about the fact that short-term aid is repetitive and doesn’t solve the underlying problems (always with a nod to the fact that, well, of course it saves lives now); then end on the dark yet hopeful twist that while aid agencies clearly don’t have it right, clearly what’s needed is ‘long-term solutions’. Yeah, cool, thanks. . . .
But what I’m really ratty about is not that what the media are saying is wrong per se. My problem is, they’re making noise but missing the point. . . . [Point 1] By rabbiting on about long-term solutions (I’m sorry, what solutions did you suggest, exactly?), they make it sound like nobody’s ever come up with that idea before. . . . Point two is, these solutions aren’t simple in the real-world.
Military intervention is about the worst solution human minds could conjure. History should be a lesson here. Somalis are phenomenal at skewing international interventions intended to help as invasions of their sovereignty. And in general Somalis are pretty duplicitous as to outsiders.
Second worst idea to me is trying to deliver via trucks and ground workers within the Shabaab zones. I fundamentally disagree that the US Gov should “work with Shabaab” as this article by Richard Dowden of the Royal African Society argues. This is a golden opportunity for the Somalis to see the results of their acquiescence to Shabaab’s presence. The easiest thing one can learn from Somali history is that when they’re sick of you they’ll find a way to overthrow you. When the communities within the Shabaab zones get sick of them they will kick them out of those communities and I know if I was living in these communities I would certainly be pretty circumspect about Shabaab. Of course no one wants to stay “starve them out” as that is cruel and inhumane treatment, but delivery within Shabaab’s areas I am 64.8% sure will end in a worse situation than never going in. As @morealtitude put it here:
Letting aid workers in solves many problems for al Shabbab. It demonstrates to its own people that it’s taking steps to solve the problem. It helps slow the outflux of refugees. It brings in resources that bolster the population- which may be appropriated by fighters at times, or the effects may be indirect, such as more money in the economy that supports fighters’ families which in turn supports them. And, if aid agencies don’t do the right thing by al Shabbab, it gives them fresh ammunition in the polarizing of its people against the west.
Not increasing aid at all within Somalia is the best possible solution in my mind. The best option within Somalia is to stay out of the diaspora’s way with respect to their remittance flows into Somalia so people can purchase from local markets.
I was talking the other day with a few friends who work in this area. They told me that the real heart-break is that after people have trekked to the refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia they are finding that the food isn’t there. In these refugee camps there is a host government who is not impeding the delivery of aid and there is a relatively well-trekked cow-path for the logisticians to follow. Increasing the flows to these areas is a relatively straight-forward process and will ease one of the main problems while staying away from the quagmire.
Next best options are to work through Somali NGOs and increase the flows that they are delivering, continue and maybe increase the air drops (although these have to be terribly costly from a utilitarian point of view, and finally increase more traditional types of delivery within Mogadishu which the TFG / AMISOM troop relatively control.
If you want to give here are some organizations (in the order I would give to them if I had disposable income and wasn’t already fully invested in Somalis):
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This is the second installment in a series which is parsing through Somaliland’s journey towards recognition. The first post in the series, the introduction is available here. One of the legal criteria for statehood is established borders. There is a serious and very well, although often, hidden question as to where Somaliland’s borders are. In this post I try to parse this a bit mainly from the perspective of international law, but also from the political perspective as well.
My friend, and fellow Somaliland voyeur, Rudie made some very interesting and important points in the comments to my previous point. One of which was:
The AU for instance has a declared policy that colonial borders will be the norm for independence. I think this was to prevent states splitting up in small tribal entities. That would create chaos due to the haphazard way in which colonial borders were drawn with no respect for tribal territories, dividing tribes between countries.
But before I get to that point of policy, let me put on my lawyer hat for a second (which looks amazing like a cowboy hat when you live in an anarchical state).
There are clearly defined baseline criteria for a state to be considered a state under international law. The first is a definable population; the second is a definable territory; the third is a government; and the fourth is the capacity to enter relations with other states.
Three of these criteria were first stated in the book, Allgemeine Staatslehre (General Theory of the State), published in 1900 by Georg Jellinek which would put them in the classification of international law of “opinions of reknowned jurists” (which is the layman’s term, it has an official term from the Vienna Convention but I’m too lazy to look it up). This is a law classification and can easily be trumped or changed by higher classifications of international law which conflict with the opinions. However, as with much of international law (and indeed, with law in general) the opinions of jurists form and shape the “real” (known to lawyers as “positive”) law.
So, what happened was later, in 1933, a regional treaty was passed which took into account the three criteria which were originally stated by Jellinek. was the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which was a treaty concluded by the Organization of American States. Since that time, these four baseline criteria have become so well understood and highly utilized that they have allegedly become fully integrated into international law and adopted by most of the world’s states. Article 1 of that convention state the four criteria listed above.
I must say, when I was doing some quick background research for this post that I learned something. The criteria for borders is less stringent than I originally thought. At least legally speaking. What the International Court of Justice (the World’s Supreme Court for matters such as these), requires is that there be a core territory (see North Sea Case, p. 32, para. 46). If there is a region of the territory which is disputed that is not a hindrance to statehood (see German Gas v. Poland, 5 A.D. 11 at 15). At least legally speaking.
I keep saying, “at least legally speaking” for a reason. Here’s the bottom line, just because a geographic area meets the criteria for statehood, does not mean that recognition is automatic. Why? Politics. Politics and law are very often intertwined (for they are two sides of the same coin). There is likely no major sector of law where politics are more intertwined than they are with international law. And even within international law, there is perhaps no norm where politics and law are more intertwined than when it comes to recognition.
In the 1960′s the US wasn’t the only territory worried about domino’s falling. The rapidly gaining independence African states were also worried about this. For those who may not fully understand African politics, let me simplify most African states are arbitrary maps on lines which were negotiated far from the ground itself. Largely there are two effect to this: (1) people who identify in very different ways have been haphazardly lumped together for no logical reason other than they traditionally resided near one another, and (2) people who identify in very similar ways have often been separated by international borders which they were given no part in making.
These are not small problems. They are still causing many, many problems throughout the continent. No matter the problems, the AU made a declaration long ago which basically froze the borders the way they were at the end of the colonial period. Why? Hard to say completely, but I suspect it was a devil you know v. devil you don’t know situation. At the end of the day there was a slippery slope argument that the politicians had to quelch. If one tribe, clan, or nation was given its independence within the colonial borders, the massive number of self-identifying entities within Africa would have demanded similar treatment and chaos would have ensued. Or so goes the theory.
For a long time the AU has tightly held this norm. South Sudan challenges this norm directly as it is the first state within Africa which very clearly violates this.
Quite a while ago now, both the US and the UK, publicly stated that they would follow the AU’s lead when it came to Somaliland. Before I came here I thought this was a good thing. It represented to me, at that time, that the US and the UK were forcing the AU to act like a grown up regional organization and would allow it to take the diplomatic lead on this issue. Publicly at least, I have seen no retraction as to this policy – as applied to the Somaliland situation.
Somalilanders feel very strongly that they meet the Montevideo Criteria #2 without violating the AU’s declaration of respect for colonial borders. Remember Somaliland was a sovereign nation for five days in 1960 (ironically enough, the first state to recognize them during that era was Israel). So Somalilanders say, we have defined borders. And they are the borders of the Somaliland Colony (or Protectorate, which Rudie challenged me on and I haven’t yet had a chance to dig up the answer from my history books here at the office). Case shut.
I don’t really know if there is a legal basis to Puntland’s argument, but Puntland does claim the far eastern regions of Somaliland as belonging to it. The border (as Somalilanders see it) does indeed run straight through the middle of a major Somali clan’s traditional homeland, so Puntland’s argument makes sense from a socio-cultural perspective, but I am not sure what their legal basis is. This divergence of opinion is the source of border scuffles which ebb and flow still.
This disputed region, according to the ICJ, does not hinder Somaliland’s statehood quest. At least legally. I suspect, it is a very real world hindrance. Why? One word. Eritrea.
Eritrea’s “break-away” from Ethiopia in the early 1990′s was not dissimilar to what Somaliland needs to accomplish. It was a unification that went awry and the break-away state wanted to reinstate its borders upon independence. The problem was that no one really knew where the border was and Ethiopia and Eritrea ended up fighting a semi-protracted war over the region which required the international community to come in, clean it up, and keep the peace.
So, the borders are very likely a very real thing in the minds of diplomats sitting at desks in Nairobi and Addis writing their home governments analysis memos about Somaliland’s recognition.
Currently, the Somaliland army does occupy almost the entirety of the territory. It doesn’t really control it, but it’s there and it’s doing the best it can with what little resources it has. The problem isn’t really from the Somaliland-Puntland perspective as much as it is from the perspective of the local people. Many of whom put up Puntland flags in their houses and claim to “not know Somaliland.” Somaliland has literally bent over backwards, giving portions of the governance sector way out of per capita proportions to clans from the East. It has attempted, when it can, to sink money into the East. It is actively encouraging development and aid agencies not only to work in the “triangle” but to also work further east. At the end of the day, the area we’re talking about would make Deadwood look like modern Stockholm in comparison. It is L A W L E S S. See here for news from this week about what happens in this area.
Although I have heard Somalilanders often claim that if recognition comes to Somaliland that the eastern clans would “come around” and support Somaliland. Behind close doors, in the majlises that I visit and sit with Somalilanders, most readily admit that it isn’t that simple. The eastern clans have traditionally been among the rules of Somalis overall. One of their major clans has a long a history of being politicians as the Isaaqs (Somaliland’s far-majority clan) have of being traders and business people. Another of their major clans was the clan of the former dictator, Siad Barre. So it isn’t quite a simple matter for them to subservient themselves to the Isaaq. Puntland (where the same clans which are in eastern Somaliland completely occupy), if it were to become a sovereign nation, would be in an awful position resource-wise. They have very little resources to speak of. The areas they claim in Somaliland are said to be decent (if not great) grazing areas and are said to have a decent amount of minerals including perhaps hydrocarbon deposits. So it isn’t a simple matter.
I was talking with a friend on Thursday about this issue and basically we could agree that the area is likely more trouble than it is worth. So I posited why doesn’t the President just cede the area to Puntland and let them deal with the problems. After it left my mouth I realized instantly why Somaliland can never do that: they would then be rewriting the colonial borders.
This is where the South Sudan precedent may be of assistance to Somaliland. If the AU either restricts or abolishes its declaration of respect for colonial borders, or at a minimum creates some exceptions, then Somaliland could potentially allow the area to go to Puntland and still argue that it meets the criteria for statehood. That is incredibly far-fetched I know, but it could be an option at least.
Up next: population
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When the cat’s away, the mice will…tweet, write grant proposals and take meta pictures. (Taken with picplz.)
Bebe Cool - Kasepiki (by bebecool1)
“You need to check this Video because it is outstanding and extremely Hot for your eyes.”
This is how you know a Somali party is just getting good. (Taken with picplz at Watershed Legal Services.)
The fake Knaan stops in for some advice. (Taken with picplz at Watershed Legal Services.)
Contrary to popular belief, taxes are lower under Obama than they were under Reagan. In 1983, when Reagan was trying to get the economy out of recession, revenues were 17.5 percent of GDP. In 2010, when Obama was trying to guide the economy into a recovery, revenues were 14.9 percent of GDP.
The end of the U.S. military’s long, bloody adventure in Iraq signals the start of a new, highly uncertain chapter in the country’s development. In the scenario conjured by optimistic U.S. and Iraqi officials, an Iraq free of tyranny, terrorism, and foreign occupation will transform itself into a modern and open economy in the heart of the Arab world. That vision recedes a bit more every day as sectarian tensions reemerge, corruption hinders development, and the country’s political leadership moves against its opponents and flirts with autocracy. Iraqis are reluctant to ask aloud if the most recent attacks represent the deadly half-life of war, or, as Abdel Sadeh and many others I spoke to during four weeks in December and January say they fear, another meltdown.
There may also be a more personal motivation for the generals. Burmese military rulers often meet with untimely or ignominious demises. The founder of the Burmese army, General Aung San (father of Aung San Suu Kyi), was assassinated in 1947 just months before the independence from Britain he had fought so hard to achieve. General Ne Win, who seized power in 1962 and ruled Burma for more than a quarter of a century, saw his family charged with plotting to overthrow the government in 2002. Though the aged ruler had officially retired, his son-in-law and three grandsons were imprisoned, and he and his favorite daughter were placed under house arrest. Other top generals have had similarly miserable fates and few have been able to retire peacefully. The Burmese use the phrase wut leh deh—which means something akin to “what goes around comes around”—to explain this inescapable cycle of karmic retribution.
The answer lies in harnessing the positive tensions that naturally build when any existing social or cultural paradigm can be challenged by the introduction of innovative ideas, products, or services. Without a profound understanding of what people will be ready and willing to introduce into their lives, even brilliant products have regularly failed on markets not mature enough to digest their full potential. Harnessing these tensions is in itself an art that only a group of talented individuals have proven to be capable of mastering.
The people can never understand why the President does not use his supposedly great power to make ’em behave. Well, all the President is, is a glorified public relations man who spends his time flattering, kissing and kicking people to get them to do what they are supposed to do anyway.
In the back-and-forth between Clinton and Gingrich, and in the elections of 2000 and 2004, I sometimes felt as if I were watching the psychodrama of the Baby Boom generation—a tale rooted in old grudges and revenge plots hatched on a handful of college campuses long ago—played out on the national stage.